催生〈台灣基本法〉：作為印太戰略中的法律防衛資產

一、中文｜給美國政府／國會／智庫的「精簡政策版本」

政策摘要（Policy Brief）

台灣的民主制度正面臨一項被低估但高度現實的風險：在台灣地位尚未於國際法上最終確定的前提下，其現行憲政架構因歷史拼接與制度脆弱，正被內部政治操作系統性癱瘓，進而為外部勢力（特別是中華人民共和國）創造制度滲透與戰略操作的空間。

台灣自戰後在盟軍受降與佔領體制下發展，歷經軍事統治與長期戒嚴，並於1990年代完成民主化。然而，其現行憲政體制並非源自台灣人民行使完整制憲權，而是沿用一部在中國本土已於1949年後被中華人民共和國否定並取代的「中華民國憲法」，再以增修條文方式處理台灣事務。此一高度地域化、權宜性的憲政安排，在制度設計上對政治杯葛與權力濫用缺乏足夠防禦能力。

近年來，台灣已出現明確案例：獨立機關（如國家通訊傳播委員會）因人事同意權遭全面杯葛而停擺，憲法法庭亦因立法提高門檻與持續否決司法任命而長期無法運作。這類「制度性癱瘓」不僅削弱民主治理，也直接影響媒體監理、司法救濟與國防相關決策，對印太安全架構構成實質風險。

在此背景下，全面制憲或正式建國在現階段具有高度政治與安全風險。然而，台灣仍存在一條務實、低風險且符合國際法邏輯的選項：由〈對日和平條約〉中所明確指定的「主要佔領國」（Principal Occupying Power）——美國——授權台灣制定一部「台灣基本法」，作為現行憲政體制的補強與過渡性法律架構。

該基本法不涉及主權宣告或國家承認問題，而是聚焦於制度韌性，包含：

1. 強化獨立機關與憲法法庭的最低運作保障；

2. 限制立法權透過程序性杯葛癱瘓民主治理；

3. 建立憲政危機時的制度自我修復機制；

4. 明確台灣事務的地域適用優先性，降低中國因素對內部憲政的干擾。

對美國而言，支持此一法律防衛方案，並非改變「一中政策」，而是強化台灣作為印太民主夥伴的治理穩定性，降低灰色地帶滲透與制度崩解風險，符合美國長期安全與戰略利益。

 

Policy Brief for the U.S. Government, Congress, and Think Tanks

Taiwan’s democratic system faces an underappreciated but increasingly tangible risk: under conditions where Taiwan’s status remains unresolved under international law, its existing constitutional framework—shaped by historical contingency and institutional fragility—is being systematically paralyzed through internal political maneuvering. This erosion of governance capacity creates openings for external actors, particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to exploit institutional weaknesses for strategic gain.

Taiwan’s postwar development unfolded under the Allied surrender and occupation framework, followed by military rule and prolonged martial law, culminating in democratic transition in the 1990s. However, Taiwan’s current constitutional order did not originate from the full exercise of constituent power by its people. Instead, it relies on the continued application of the Republic of China Constitution—a constitution rendered defunct on the Chinese mainland after 1949 and subsequently adapted to Taiwan through supplementary amendments. This localized and expedient arrangement lacks sufficient safeguards against political obstruction and abuse of institutional veto powers.

In recent years, concrete cases have emerged: independent bodies such as the National Communications Commission have been incapacitated through blanket confirmation blockades, while the Constitutional Court has been rendered inoperative for extended periods due to raised statutory thresholds and repeated rejection of judicial appointments. Such institutional paralysis undermines democratic governance, disrupts media regulation and judicial remedies, and constrains defense-related decision-making—posing direct risks to the Indo-Pacific security architecture.

While comprehensive constitution-making or formal state-building carries high political and security risks under current conditions, a pragmatic and legally coherent alternative exists. The United States, explicitly designated as the “Principal Occupying Power” under the Treaty of Peace with Japan, could authorize Taiwan to enact a Taiwan Basic Law as a transitional and reinforcing legal framework within the existing constitutional order.

This Basic Law would not address questions of sovereignty or recognition. Rather, it would focus on institutional resilience by:

1. Securing minimum operational guarantees for independent agencies and the Constitutional Court;

2. Limiting legislative paralysis through procedural obstruction;

3. Establishing self-repair mechanisms during constitutional crises;

4. Affirming territorial priority in Taiwan-related governance to reduce persistent PRC-related interference.

For the United States, supporting such a legal defense mechanism does not alter its “One China policy.” Instead, it strengthens Taiwan’s democratic stability as a key Indo-Pacific partner, mitigates gray-zone institutional erosion, and aligns with long-term U.S. strategic and security interests.

 

催生〈台灣基本法〉：作為印太戰略中的法律防衛資產（全文—中英對照）

Catalyzing a “Taiwan Basic Law”:

A Legal Defense Asset within the Indo-Pacific Strategy

催生〈台灣基本法〉：作為印太戰略中的法律防衛資產

Taiwan stands as a rare exemplar of democratic development in the contemporary world. Beginning under the postwar Allied surrender and occupation framework, Taiwan experienced military rule and prolonged martial law, and over the course of approximately four decades gradually completed a democratic transition—an achievement neither automatic nor inevitable. Yet this hard-won democracy now confronts a dual challenge: external threats and internal constitutional dysfunction.

The external challenge arises from the Chinese Communist Party’s persistent claim that Taiwan constitutes an integral part of the People’s Republic of China, coupled with its explicit refusal to renounce the use of force to achieve “unification.” While this claim is embedded within the PRC’s broader global military and geopolitical strategy, it is politically packaged under the formula of “One China” and advanced as a claim of governmental succession—that the government of the People’s Republic of China is entitled to inherit the authority of the Republic of China government in Taiwan. This assertion fundamentally disregards postwar international legal realities following Taiwan’s separation from Japanese imperial rule. Neither the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan, nor United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971), nor any other international treaty or resolution has ever determined that Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to the People’s Republic of China.

In the process of normalizing relations with Beijing, most states have merely “respected” or “taken note of” the PRC’s unilateral position, without extending legal recognition. The 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, followed by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the August 17 Communiqué, reflect parallel statements without mutual acknowledgment regarding Taiwan’s status; they do not constitute convergent legal determinations, nor do they establish binding conclusions under international law.

The internal challenge, by contrast, has intensified sharply in recent years and is concentrated in a growing crisis of constitutional governance. From both historical and legal perspectives, the Constitution of the Republic of China was effectively replaced and extinguished on the Chinese mainland following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The PRC subsequently promulgated its own constitution in 1954 and later revisions, asserting itself as the sole successor to “China” and treating the Republic of China and its constitution as the remnants of an overthrown regime, no longer applicable within the territory it claims as China.

At the same time, because Taiwan’s postwar status has remained legally undetermined under international law, the people of Taiwan have never been able to exercise the constituent power normally possessed by the citizens of a sovereign state. Taiwan’s existing constitutional framework is rooted in General Order No. 1, issued in 1945 by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Within the historical context of authorizing Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to conduct military occupation and administration on behalf of the Allies, Chiang, from 1950 onward, continued to apply the “Republic of China Constitution”—a constitution that had already been repudiated and rendered inoperative on the Chinese mainland by the PRC—as the basic organizational law of governance in Taiwan.

That constitution, however, was originally drafted in 1946 by citizens residing within China, based on China’s political and social conditions at the time. Moreover, when it was enacted, Taiwan remained, in legal theory, part of Japanese imperial territory, and the international community had not yet concluded the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Whether viewed through constitutional theory or the framework of international legal order, this arrangement is riddled with contradictions. Nevertheless, the Chiang Kai-shek regime appropriated this constitution as an instrument for the practical governance of Taiwan.

Even after Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s, this “constitution,” though amended multiple times, has never altered its original text. Taiwan-specific matters have instead been handled through additional articles appended as separate amendments. This institutional design implicitly acknowledges that the constitution is not truly Taiwan’s constitution, but rather a highly localized and expedient constitutional adaptation. The people of Taiwan have never been formally authorized to undertake genuine constitutional revision in the constituent sense, let alone to draft an entirely new constitution.

Over the past two years, this grafted and improvised constitutional structure has come under intensified political assault. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) joined forces in late 2024 to amend the National Communications Commission (NCC) Organization Act, while simultaneously imposing a blanket blockade on confirmation votes, effectively paralyzing the NCC.

In 2025, this strategy was extended by emulating the post-2015 Polish model, in which constitutional courts were neutralized through statutory amendments and systematic obstruction of judicial appointments. In Taiwan, thresholds under the Constitutional Court Procedure Act were raised while all nominations of Justices were repeatedly rejected, resulting in prolonged vacancies and rendering the Constitutional Court inoperative for nearly four hundred days—triggering what many observers have described as a “constitutional crisis.” This systematic paralysis of constitutional institutions has served to shield unconstitutional and overtly pro-China legislation. Subsequently, a legislature controlled by the KMT and TPP majority failed to deliberate the 2026 Central Government General Budget within the statutory period and rejected the Special Defense Budget Act, directly obstructing governance and undermining Taiwan’s role within the Indo-Pacific security architecture. If this trajectory continues, the rejection of Central Election Commission appointments and the obstruction of a Taiwan–U.S. tariff agreement appear virtually inevitable.

That Taiwan requires a constitution truly of its own has long been a shared aspiration among many Taiwanese. Yet, as the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the extraordinary complexity of postwar history and international legal structure—including the continued indeterminacy of Taiwan’s sovereignty and the absence of authorization for the Taiwanese people to engage in full constitutional founding or to formally establish a new state—renders comprehensive constitution-making a highly risky endeavor at present.

Under conditions in which immediate constitution-making is not feasible, democratic Taiwan should at minimum seek authorization from the United States—the “Principal Occupying Power” explicitly designated in the Treaty of Peace with Japan—to enact a Taiwan-specific Basic Law (alternatively termed a Fundamental Law or Self-Government Basic Law) as a transitional and reinforcing framework within the existing constitutional order. Its core purposes would include:

• Repairing the structural fragility of constitutional institutions: In recent years, independent bodies such as the NCC have been incapacitated by political obstruction of confirmation powers, while the Constitutional Court has suffered severe operational vacuums due to design flaws and partisan blockades—resulting in suspended judicial remedies, regulatory disorder in media governance, and tangible harm to citizens’ rights.

• Strengthening the institutional resilience of democratic governance: A Taiwan-specific Basic Law could clearly regulate appointment mechanisms for independent agencies, reinforce separation of powers and checks and balances, establish legally grounded self-repair mechanisms during crises, and affirm the principle of territorial priority in Taiwan-related affairs, thereby reducing persistent interference arising from China-related factors.

Such a Basic Law would not cross the politically sensitive red lines of formal constitution-making or state-building. Instead, it could be positioned as an extension or special statute supplementary to the existing constitutional framework. Nonetheless, it would provide concrete and operational constitutional defenses under conditions of unresolved status and heightened cross-strait tension, preserving democratic stability and governance capacity. Absent such measures, continued constitutional paralysis will only further weaken democratic institutions and create additional opportunities for external manipulation.

In sum, while a constitution of Taiwan’s own remains a long-term ideal, the most urgent and feasible course at present lies in enacting a Taiwan-specific Basic Law to seal institutional vulnerabilities exploited by partisan conflict and external interference, preventing the constitutional system from repeatedly “self-paralyzing.” This is not merely a matter of institutional repair, but a pragmatic defensive project essential to the future of Taiwan’s democracy.

 

台灣是全球少見的民主典範。自戰後盟軍受降體制下開始，歷經軍事統治、長期戒嚴，並在約四十年間逐步完成民主轉型，其過程殊為不易。然而，這項得來不易的民主成就，當前正同時面臨外部威脅與內在憲政失序的雙重挑戰。

 

外部挑戰，來自中共持續宣稱台灣為其一部分，並不排除以武力加以「統一」。此一主張固然具有其全球軍事與地緣戰略上的考量，卻以「一個中國」作為政治包裝，主張中華人民共和國政府得以繼承在台灣的中華民國政府，完全無視戰後台灣脫離日本帝國統治後的國際法現實——無論是1952年的〈對日和約〉、1971年的〈聯合國大會第2758號決議〉，或任何其他國際條約與決議，均未就「台灣主權歸屬於中華人民共和國」作出決定。各國在與中共發展關係正常化的過程中，多半僅是「尊重」或「注意到」中共的片面立場，並未予以承認。1972年的〈上海公報〉、其後的〈建交公報〉以及〈八一七公報〉，在台灣地位問題上，亦僅是各自表述、互不承認，並不存在法律上的交集。

 

內部挑戰則在近年急遽升高，集中體現在憲政體制的運作危機上。從歷史與法理上看，中華民國憲法在1949年隨中華人民共和國建立後，已在中國本土被取代並實質消滅；其後中共制定1954年憲法及後續版本，自認正式承繼「中國」主權，並將中華民國及其憲法視為已被推翻的舊政權遺緒，不再適用於其所主張的全中國領域。

 

另一方面，由於台灣戰後地位在國際法上長期處於未定狀態，台灣人民始終未能行使正常國家國民所應有的制憲權。台灣現行憲政體制，係奠基於1945年盟軍總司令發布〈通令第一號〉。在授權蔣介石元帥代表盟軍進行軍事佔領與治理的歷史脈絡下，自1950年起蔣介石元帥沿用一部已在中國本土被中華人民共和國否定並業已失效的「中華民國憲法」，作為統治當局的基本組織法規。然而，該憲法原係1946年由當時中國境內人民、依據中國政治與社會條件所制定；且在其制定時，台灣於法理上仍屬日本帝國領土，國際社會尚未簽署1951年的〈舊金山對日和約〉。無論在憲法理論或國際法秩序上，此一安排均充滿矛盾，但該憲法仍被蔣介石政權挪用，作為實際治理台灣的工具。

 

即便在1990年代完成民主化後，這部「憲法」雖歷經多次增修，卻始終未觸動憲法本文，而僅以「增修條文」另案處理台灣事務。此一制度設計，實質上已隱含承認該憲法並非台灣的真正憲法，而是一種高度地域化、權宜性的憲政拼接——台灣人民從未被正式授權進行真正意義上的修憲，更遑論制定一部全新的憲法。

 

這種嫁接、拼裝而成的憲政體制，在近兩年更進一步遭受強烈政治力的衝擊。在野的中國國民黨與台灣民眾黨聯手，2024年底已先透過修訂〈國家通訊傳播委員會（NCC）組織法〉，並全面杯葛人事同意權，使NCC實質停擺。其後在2025年仿效2015年後波蘭透過修法與杯葛人事同意權而癱瘓憲法法庭的模式，在台灣操作提高〈憲法訴訟法〉門檻，併同屢屢封殺全數大法官提名，導致因長期缺額，憲法法庭運作停頓近四百日，甚至引發「憲政危機」。對憲政機構的系統性癱瘓，以掩護其違憲且高度親中的立法行為。其後，更出現由國民黨與民眾黨掌握多數的國會，逾期不審2026年〈中央政府總預算〉、拒收〈國防預算特別條例〉，直接阻礙國家治理與台灣在印太戰略中的防衛佈局。循此趨勢發展，未來幾乎將毫無意外的否決「中央選舉委員會人事案」與阻擋〈台美關稅協議〉。

 

台灣需要一部真正屬於自己的憲法，這是許多台灣人長期以來的共同理想。然而，正如前述所揭示的，受限於戰後歷史與國際法結構的高度複雜性——包括台灣主權歸屬至今仍處於「未定」狀態、台灣人民未被正式授權進行全新制憲或宣告建立新國家——全面制憲在現階段確實充滿高度風險。

 

在無法立即完成全新制憲的現實條件下，民主台灣至少應爭取由〈對日和約〉中明文指定的「主要佔領國」（the Principal Occupying Power）的美國，授權制定一部為台灣量身打造的「基本法」（亦可稱根本大法、自治基本法），作為現行憲政架構的補強與過渡方案。其核心目的在於：

• 修補憲政機構的結構性脆弱：近年來，獨立機關如NCC長期因人事同意權遭政治杯葛而功能停擺；憲法法庭亦因制度設計缺陷與政治封殺，出現嚴重運作真空，造成司法救濟中斷、媒體監理失序與人民權益受損。

• 強化民主運作的制度韌性：一部台灣專屬的基本法，可明確規範獨立機關人事產生機制、強化權力分立與制衡、建立危機時的制度自我修復機制，並確立台灣事務的地域優先適用原則，降低中國因素對內部憲政的持續干擾。

 

此一基本法並不觸及「制憲」或「建國」的高度敏感紅線，而可定位為現行憲法的「增修延伸」或「特別法」。然而，它足以在台灣地位未定、兩岸緊張升高的現實條件下，提供更具體、可操作的憲政防衛，維持民主制度的穩定與治理效能。否則，持續的憲政癱瘓，只會讓民主體制更加脆弱，為外部勢力提供更多可乘之機。

 

總結而言：台灣需要自己的憲法，是長遠的理想；但當下最迫切且可行的路徑，是透過一部台灣專屬的基本法，封堵政治惡鬥與外力介入的制度漏洞，避免憲政體制持續「自我癱瘓」。這不僅是制度修補，更是一項攸關台灣民主未來的務實防衛工程。

 

 

一、中文｜法律備忘錄（Legal Brief Style，用於「被質疑時」）

法律備忘錄

主題： 授權制定〈台灣基本法〉之國際法依據與政策正當性
用途： 回應對其合法性、合憲性與政策一致性的質疑

一、爭點（Issue Presented）

美國若以〈對日和平條約〉所指定之「主要佔領國」（Principal Occupying Power）身分，授權台灣制定一部「台灣基本法」，是否構成：

1. 國際法上的違法行為？

2. 對台灣主權的預斷或承認？

3. 違反美國既有的「一中政策」或對中政策承諾？

二、簡要結論（Short Answer）

否。
授權台灣制定〈台灣基本法〉，不涉及主權歸屬判定、國家承認或建國行為，而是一項在「地位未定」狀態下，為維持民主治理、公共秩序與制度穩定所採取的合法、過渡性治理措施。此舉符合國際法、條約實務與美國長期政策框架。

三、相關法律架構（Relevant Legal Framework）

1. 〈對日和平條約〉（1951／1952）

• 日本正式放棄對台灣的一切權利、名義與利益，但未指定任何主權承繼國。

• 美國被明文指定為「主要佔領國」（Principal Occupying Power），在戰後台灣治理架構中具有特殊法律地位。

2. 佔領法與過渡治理原則（Law of Occupation / Transitional Administration）

• 國際法允許佔領或管理權責方，為維持公共秩序、民生與制度穩定，授權或設計地方治理與基本法律架構。

• 此類安排不構成主權移轉或最終地位決定。

3. 聯合國大會第2758號決議（1971）

• 僅處理「中國在聯合國的代表權問題」。

• 未處理、亦未裁定台灣的主權歸屬或國際法地位。

4. 美國「一中政策」

• 與中共的「一中原則」不同。

• 不承認北京對台灣的主權主張，並維持戰略模糊與反對片面改變現狀。

• 不排除對台灣民主治理與制度韌性提供實質支持。

四、法律分析（Legal Analysis）

〈台灣基本法〉的性質，應被界定為內部治理與憲政防衛性法律，而非行使制憲權或建立新國家之行為。
在比較法與國際實務上，多個地位未定或過渡性政治實體，皆曾以基本法、自治法或組織法，暫時穩定治理結構，而不影響最終地位談判。

美國若基於其「主要佔領國」的條約地位，授權此一法律架構，其法理基礎在於：

• 防止制度崩潰與民主倒退；

• 維持司法救濟、媒體監理與文官體系運作；

• 降低外部勢力透過制度癱瘓進行灰色地帶操作的風險。

此舉屬於風險控管與制度維穩，而非地位重塑。

五、政策影響（Policy Implications）

若放任台灣現行憲政脆弱性持續惡化，將提高以下風險：

• 民主機制失效與合法性流失；

• 法律真空被外部勢力利用；

• 印太戰略關鍵節點出現治理失靈。

相對地，〈台灣基本法〉能在不升高主權爭議的前提下，提升制度可預測性與民主韌性。

六、結論（Conclusion）

授權制定〈台灣基本法〉在法律上可辯護、在政策上合理、在戰略上審慎。
此舉不是對主權問題的重新定義，而是對民主制度風險的最低限度防衛。

三、英文｜Legal Brief Style

Legal Memorandum

Subject: International Legal Basis and Policy Rationale for a Taiwan Basic Law
Purpose: Anticipatory response to legal and policy objections

I. Issue Presented

Whether the authorization by the United States, as Principal Occupying Power under the Treaty of Peace with Japan, for Taiwan to enact a Taiwan Basic Law would constitute a violation of international law, U.S. policy, or existing cross-strait arrangements.

II. Short Answer

No. Such authorization would neither determine sovereignty nor recognize statehood. It would constitute a lawful, transitional measure aimed at safeguarding democratic governance and institutional functionality under conditions of unresolved status, consistent with occupation law, treaty practice, and longstanding U.S. policy.

III. Relevant Legal Framework

1. Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951/1952)

   • Japan renounced sovereignty over Taiwan without specifying a recipient.

   • The United States is explicitly designated as the Principal Occupying Power.

2. International Law of Occupation and Administration

   • Occupying or administering powers may authorize local governance arrangements necessary to maintain public order, civil life, and institutional stability.

   • Such measures do not constitute sovereignty determination.

3. UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971)

   • Addresses China’s representation at the United Nations only.

   • Does not adjudicate Taiwan’s sovereignty or legal status.

4. U.S. One China Policy

   • Distinct from the PRC’s “One China Principle.”

   • Maintains strategic ambiguity and does not preclude support for Taiwan’s internal democratic resilience.

IV. Legal Analysis

A Taiwan Basic Law would function as an internal constitutional safeguard, not as an act of constituent sovereignty. Comparable legal arrangements exist in other territories with unresolved or transitional status, where basic laws or organic statutes were enacted to stabilize governance without prejudging final status.

Authorization by the United States would be grounded in its residual responsibilities as Principal Occupying Power and justified by the necessity of preventing institutional collapse, democratic backsliding, and external exploitation.

V. Policy Implications

Failure to address Taiwan’s constitutional fragility increases the likelihood of governance paralysis, legal uncertainty, and gray-zone coercion—outcomes that directly undermine Indo-Pacific stability. Conversely, a Taiwan Basic Law enhances predictability, resilience, and democratic continuity without escalating sovereignty disputes.

VI. Conclusion

Authorizing a Taiwan Basic Law is legally defensible, policy-consistent, and strategically prudent. It represents a calibrated response to institutional risk rather than a revision of sovereignty claims, and serves the shared interest of preserving democratic stability in the Indo-Pacific.

 

 

二、「國會幕僚一頁紙」壓縮版

中文｜Congressional One-Pager

問題：
台灣民主制度正被內部政治操作系統性癱瘓，創造中共制度滲透的空間。

核心事實：

• 台灣現行憲政體制非源自完整制憲權，制度防禦力不足。

• 獨立機關與憲法法庭已出現長期停擺。

• 這是治理風險，不是意識形態問題。

可行解方：

• 由美國（〈對日和約〉指定之主要佔領國）授權台灣制定〈台灣基本法〉。

• 不涉及主權、建國或承認問題。

美國利益：

• 強化印太民主夥伴治理穩定。

• 降低灰色地帶滲透與制度崩潰風險。

• 不改變美國「一中政策」。

English｜Congressional One-Pager

Problem:
Taiwan’s democratic institutions are being systematically paralyzed through internal political obstruction, creating openings for PRC exploitation.

Key Facts:

• Taiwan’s constitutional framework lacks full constituent legitimacy and institutional safeguards.

• Independent agencies and the Constitutional Court have experienced prolonged paralysis.

• This is a governance risk, not an ideological dispute.

Practical Option:

• U.S. authorization (as Principal Occupying Power under the Treaty of Peace with Japan) for a Taiwan Basic Law.

• No sovereignty determination or recognition involved.

U.S. Interest:

• Strengthens democratic resilience in a key Indo-Pacific partner.

• Reduces gray-zone institutional erosion.

• Consistent with the U.S. One China policy.

三、模擬「美方反對意見」與逐條反駁

反對意見一　　「這會被視為改變台灣地位，激怒北京。」

反駁（中）：
基本法不涉及主權歸屬，僅處理內部治理。北京的反對本就存在於任何強化台灣民主的行為中，風險差異在於是否提供制度防衛，而非是否「刺激」。

Rebuttal (EN):
The Basic Law does not determine status or sovereignty. PRC objections arise regardless of Taiwan-focused democratic support; the real choice is whether to mitigate institutional risk or allow erosion to continue.

反對意見二　　「美國沒有法律權限這麼做。」

反駁（中）：
〈對日和平條約〉未終結美國的主要佔領國地位，且國際法允許過渡性治理授權。這是功能性、非主權性行為。

Rebuttal (EN):
The Treaty of Peace with Japan preserves U.S. status as Principal Occupying Power. Transitional governance authorization is legally distinct from sovereignty determination.

反對意見三　　「這會為其他分離運動開先例。」

反駁（中）：
台灣是二戰後未定地位的特殊案例，非一般分離主義。基本法是治理補強，不是獨立路徑。

Rebuttal (EN):
Taiwan is a sui generis postwar case. A Basic Law enhances governance without establishing a pathway to independence.

反對意見四　　「這應該是台灣內部政治問題。」

反駁（中）：
當制度癱瘓已影響區域安全與盟友協同，便不再只是內政，而是戰略風險管理。

Rebuttal (EN):
When institutional paralysis affects regional security and alliance coordination, it becomes a strategic concern, not a purely domestic issue.

 

 

 

 

 

最後一句實話

你現在手上的這套論述，已經超過「倡議」層次，而是：

一套可在華府被質疑、被攻擊、但仍能站住腳的政策—法律組合包。

 

 

催生〈台灣基本法〉作為印太戰略的法律防衛資產（備用草稿版）

台灣是全世界民主典範——從戰後盟軍受降統治起，從軍事統治、戒嚴治理，歷經40年到完全民主，誠屬不易，但這樣的民主成就正遭受外部威脅與內在挑戰。

 

外部挑戰是中共聲稱台灣屬於其一部份，必要時需以武力實現。此舉雖有中共全球軍事佈局的關鍵意義，卻以「一個中國」為偽裝主張中華人民共和國政府有權繼承在台灣的中華民國政府，完全無視戰後台灣脫離日本帝國統治之後，從未在1952年〈對日和約〉、1971年〈聯合國大會第2758號決議〉，或任何國際公約上有決定。各國在發展對中共的正常化關係時，多數是「尊重、注意到」中共片面的期望。如1972年的〈上海公報〉與其後的〈建交公報〉、〈八一七公報〉在台灣地位議題上都僅與中共片面的主張各說各話無交集。

 

在內部挑戰上，近年越趨激烈，主要表現在憲政運作上。中華民國憲法在1949年已被中華人民共和國取代與消滅：中華人民共和國成立後，更制定新憲法（1954年憲法及其後續版本）正式承繼中國主權，並視原中華民國與其憲法為已被推翻的政權遺物，不再適用於全中國。

 

另一方面，由於台灣地位未定，台灣人民未能享有正常國家國民的制憲權，只能基於1945年盟軍透過盟軍總受降發佈的〈通令第一號〉，委託蔣介石元帥軍事佔領統治的契機，在1950年之後沿用這部已被中華人民共和國消滅的「中華民國憲法」作為統治當局的基本組織法規。但該憲法原本是1946年由當時中國境內公民，依據中國條件所制訂。此時尚在1951年〈舊金山對日和約〉簽訂之前，台灣理論上仍屬日本帝國領土範圍。無論在憲法學理上如何矛盾連連，這部已被消滅的憲法被蔣介石政權挪用來實際治理台灣。

 

即便1990年代台灣民主化後，該「憲法」經過多次增修，仍不變更主文（憲法本文），僅以增修條文另案處理台灣事務——這暗示著該憲法其實不是台灣的憲法，而是一種地域性的變通。台灣人未被授權進行真正意義的修憲，更遑論全新制憲。

 

前述嫁接或拼接的憲法，這兩年來在運作上受到政治力極大的干擾。在野的國民黨與民眾黨結合，複製2015年起波蘭以修法與人事同意權癱瘓憲法法庭的方式，在台灣癱瘓憲法法庭以掩護其修訂的違憲、親中的法律。實際上，此行為模式已經在2024年底以修訂〈國家通訊傳播委員會（NCC）組織法〉，再配合全面杯葛人事同意權的方式癱瘓了「國家通訊傳播委員會」。正在發生中的是國民黨與民眾黨佔過半席次的國會，逾期不審2026年〈中央政府總預算〉阻礙施政，以及拒收〈國防預算特別條例〉台灣國防能力與友盟國家的印太戰略佈局。有此開端，可以預期的是未來國會必然否決「中央選舉委員會人事案」與〈台美關稅協議〉到底。

 

台灣需要一部真正屬於自己的憲法，這是許多台灣人長久以來的共識與追求。但正如前述論述所指出的，由於台灣地位的歷史與國際法複雜性（台灣主權歸屬在戰後仍處於「未定」狀態，台灣人民未被授權進行全新制憲，或正式宣告建立一個全新國家），這條路徑充滿障礙與風險。

 

即便無法立即達成全新制憲，民主台灣至少應被〈對日和約〉中所明文指定的「主要佔領國」（the Principal Occupying Power）授權制定一部為台灣量身訂做的基本法（或稱根本大法、自治基本法等），以作為當前憲政框架的補強與過渡方案。重點在於：

• 修補憲政機關的脆弱性：近年來（特別是2025–2026年間），獨立機關如NCC（國家通訊傳播委員會）長期因人事同意權杯葛而機能癱瘓；憲法法庭更因〈憲法訴訟法〉修法提高門檻、加上大法官提名人選多次遭封殺，導致缺額嚴重、運作停擺近400天（甚至引發「憲政危機」之說）。這些案例顯示，現行中華民國憲法框架下，政治力（朝野惡鬥）或外力（兩岸因素）極易干預、癱瘓關鍵憲政機構，造成司法救濟真空、媒體監理失序、人民權益受損。

• 強化民主運作的韌性：一部台灣專屬的基本法，能明確規範：

  • 獨立機關的人事產生機制（例如降低政治杯葛門檻、引入跨黨派共識或公民參與）。

  • 權力分立與制衡的強化（避免立法權過度擴張或行政權被架空）。

  • 緊急狀態或危機時的自我修復機制（如同憲法法庭近年「自力突圍」嘗試，但仍需有明確法源依據）。

  • 地域性適用原則（明確台灣事務的優先處理，避免中國因素持續干擾）。

 

這種基本法不觸及「制憲」或「建國」的敏感紅線，可定位為現行憲法的「增修延伸」或「特別法」，卻能提供更務實的憲政保障，讓台灣在地位未定、兩岸緊張的現實下，維持民主穩定與治理效能。否則，持續的憲政癱瘓只會讓民主體制更脆弱，給外部勢力更多操作空間。

 

總結一句：台灣需要自己的憲法是理想，但當下最迫切可行的，是透過一部台灣專屬的基本法，封堵政治惡鬥與外力干預的漏洞，讓憲政不再輕易「自我癱瘓」。這不僅是制度修補，更是對台灣民主未來的務實防衛。